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Last Update: October 24, 2026 4 min read


BYauthor-thumberic

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This is part twelve of the ASX order book series. The previous post was about sizing by setup grade. This one is about the most dangerous sizing decision of all: adding to a position that's going against you.

I read several trading journals end to end, written by traders with very different styles and very different results. Their worst losses had almost nothing in common in terms of setup, stock or market. But they had nearly everything in common in terms of behaviour. Each catastrophic loss followed the same sequence.

Anatomy of the spiral

  1. A conviction trade. The trader has a strong view. Often it's a fade: a stock has run "too far" and must come back. Sometimes it's a long in a stock that "can't go lower."
  2. A small adverse move. Nothing dramatic. A loss of one or two R. The stop is hit, or should be.
  3. No exit. The trader tells themselves it's noise, or that the price is now even better.
  4. An add. The position doubles at a "better" price. The average entry improves. The breakeven point gets closer.
  5. An anchor. From now on the trader isn't managing a trade. They're waiting for breakeven.
  6. A further move against. Often the move that triggers a short squeeze, or a cascade of selling.
  7. Another add, or a freeze. The position is now far larger than any planned trade.
  8. Capitulation. The exit finally happens, usually near the worst price of the move, often after holding overnight.

The final loss is a large multiple of the original planned risk. In the journals I read, single losses from this sequence wiped out weeks or months of earlier gains in a single day or two.

Why it's so tempting: it usually works

The cruel part is that averaging down usually works. Most adverse moves do retrace at least partially. So a trader who averages down gets rewarded most of the time: the position comes back, they exit at breakeven or a small profit, and they learn that not cutting is fine.

Here's a synthetic simulation of a simple rule: on a losing trade, instead of stopping out at -1R, double the position and wait for breakeven, with a hard limit of -10R.

python
import numpy as np

def averaging_policy(trials=100_000, seed=7):
    rng = np.random.default_rng(seed)
    results = []
    for _ in range(trials):
        # after the first -1R move, does price retrace to the new breakeven
        # before reaching the disaster level?
        if rng.random() < 0.85:
            results.append(0.0)    # bailed out at breakeven
        else:
            results.append(-10.0)  # forced out at the disaster level
    r = np.array(results)
    return r.mean(), (r == 0).mean(), (r == -10).mean()

print(averaging_policy())   # roughly (-1.5, 0.85, 0.15)

Under these made-up assumptions, the averaging trader "saves" the trade 85% of the time, and feels great about it. But the average outcome is about -1.5R per losing trade, versus -1R for the trader who just takes the stop. And the distribution is horrible: most of the time nothing happens, and occasionally a single trade costs ten times the planned risk.

This is the variable reward trap we'll look at in the psychology track: the behaviour is reinforced by frequent small rewards while the rare large punishment is dismissed as bad luck. Several journals explicitly noted they kept getting rewarded for bad discipline, and that this made it very hard to change.

Fading strength: the most common version

Across the journals, the single most common setting for the spiral was shorting a stock that was going up hard. The reasoning is always similar: the move is irrational, the valuation is absurd, it's up too much in a day. All of that might even be true. But a stock moving parabolically with heavy volume can go much further than seems reasonable, and short sellers being forced to cover add fuel.

The traders who survived this learned a simple rule, usually after paying for it more than once: trade with the trend and the catalyst, not against it, unless the book shows a clear, specific reason the move is ending. "It's up too much" isn't a reason.

Planned scaling is not averaging down

There's an important distinction. Scaling into a position can be perfectly sound if it's planned:

Planned scaling
Averaging down
When decided
Before the first entry
After the trade has gone wrong
Total risk
Fixed in advance, all entries included
Grows with each add
Invalidation point
Unchanged
Keeps moving further away
Reason for adding
The setup is developing as expected
Hoping to fix the average price
Typical in
Building a swing position, buying into a level with protection
Every blow-up story

Adding to a winner as it confirms your thesis is a different behaviour again, and one several experienced traders used deliberately: start smaller, add as the trade works, keep the stop tight relative to the newest entry.

Rules that stop the spiral

These are the rules the traders in the journals ended up writing for themselves. Nearly every one of them reads like a scar.

  1. Hard stops whenever practical. A resting stop order removes the decision from the moment of pain. Traders rebuilding after a severe loss very often lean on hard stops almost all the time.
  2. Total risk is fixed at entry. If adds are allowed, they're inside the original risk budget, not on top of it.
  3. The fresh-entry test. If you weren't in this trade, would you enter it now, at this size? If not, get out.
  4. A maximum loss per trade, as a multiple of R. If any single trade reaches, say, 2R, it's closed. No exceptions, no "just this once."
  5. No overnight holds of intraday losers. A day trade that turns into an overnight hold because it's losing is no longer a day trade. It's hope with a gap risk attached.
  6. Daily loss limit. When you hit it, you stop for the day. This also prevents the next step of the spiral, which is revenge trading to win the loss back.
  7. Review every loss larger than 2R in writing. The review is the punishment, and the punishment is the point.

The recovery speed lesson

One thing I found encouraging across the journals: the traders who survived didn't stop having big losses entirely. What changed was how early they cut, and how fast they recovered. Setbacks that once took a very long time to recover from became much shorter, because they were cut earlier and the trader was trading well enough to make the money back.

The aim isn't to never be wrong. It's to make sure that being wrong is always survivable.

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Keywords

  • averaging down
  • averaging up
  • martingale
  • stop loss
  • short squeeze
  • risk management
  • blow up
  • trading psychology
  • day trading
  • cutting losses
  • ASX
  • position sizing
Previous Article
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Oct 25, 2026

Fewer Trades, Better Months

In the trading journals I read, the best months kept turning out to be the ones with the fewest trades. Why overtrading destroys edge, how a hard daily trade cap and a morning-only window can transform your statistics, and how to find your own limits from your trade history.

Next Article
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Oct 23, 2026

Size by Grade, Not by Mood

Most traders size positions by how they feel: bigger after wins, bigger still after losses. The traders whose journals I read converged on grading every setup before entry and sizing from the grade. How to build an A+/A/B grading system, why it adds edge without adding risk, and how to step size up only when you've earned it.

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